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IX. DOCUMENT PRIVILEGE
A. Introduction
Recent decisions in tobacco related lawsuits have forced the
tobacco companies to divulge many of their deepest secrets. The
purpose of this article is to examine four such decisions' to deter-
mine the courts' methodology and standards and to give practitio-
ners a rudimentary compass to help navigate the turbulent waters
of privilege issues.
B. Tobacco Litigation
1. American Tobacco Co. v. Florida
The State of Florida brought suit against various tobacco
manufacturers to recover health care expenses paid by the State for
treating smoking-related illnesses of Medicaid recipients.2  The
State's theory of the case revolved around the allegation that the
tobacco companies had engaged in fraud by covering up the sig-
nificant health risks of smoking. To prove this fraud, the State
sought discovery of documents under the crime-fraud exception to
the attorney-client privilege.4 The trial court appointed a special
master to conduct hearings on and determine the issue.5 On the
recommendation of the special master, the trial court ordered
1. American Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1997);
State v. American Tobacco Co., No. 96-2-15056-8 SEA, 1997 WL 728262 (Wash.
Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1997); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 177 F.R.D. 491,
491 (D. Kan. 1997); State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565,
1998 WL 257214 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 1, 1997).
2. American Tobacco, 697 So. 2d at 1251.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 1252. The State designated twenty documents for in camera re-
view by the special master. See id. The tobacco companies withdrew privilege as-
sertions to seven documents. See id. Of the remaining thirteen documents, the
special master concluded that eight should be produced under the crime-fraud
exception. See id.
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production, and the tobacco companies appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision in this
case of first impression.7 In so doing, it established the standards
for and a method of determining whether the crime-fraud excep-
tion applies in Florida.
To determine whether the crime-fraud exception applies, the
court employed a three-step process. The first step requires that
the court determine the issue of privilege." Florida employs a pol-
icy of extra vigilance when it comes to claims of attorney-clientS 9
privilege by corporations. Because corporations can only act
through their agents and because they tend to rely on their attor-
neys for business advice more than an individual person would, the
court must "strike a balance between encouraging corporations to
seek legal advice and preventing corporate attorneys from being
used as shields to thwart discovery."' ° Thus, the tobacco companies
not only had to show that the documents they sought to protect
from discovery were privileged, but they had to do so under a
"heightened level of scrutiny.""
Second, the party seeking discovery must make a prima facie
showing that the exception applies. 2 The special master found in
the in camera review that the State had presented evidence that, on
its face, showed the defendants "hid from and misrepresented to
the public the health risks of smoking ...... 13 This conduct consti-
tuted fraud in the eyes of the special master.14 Further, the evi-
dence presented by the State showed the defendants had used their
counsel in carrying out their misrepresentations and in concealing
research relating to the dangers of smoking. 15 Thus, the special
master found prima facie evidence that the tobacco companies had
committed fraud and had utilized their attorneys to perpetuate that
6. See id. The tobacco companies filed exceptions to the special master's re-
port. See id. The trial court overruled the exceptions and confirmed the special
master's report. See id.
7. See id. at 1256-57.
8. See id. at 1253.
9. See id.
10. Id. (citing Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1383
(Fla. 1994)).
11. Id. (citing Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1383
(Fla. 1994)).
12. See id. at 1254-55.
13. Id. at 1257.
14. See id.
15. See id.
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fraud.
16
Third, the parties engage in an adversarial proceeding in
which the party opposing production must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that privilege should remain." Using the
model established by Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc .,1 the trial court
allowed the defendants to argue extensively and to present ex parte
evidence to rebut the State's evidence. 19 If the trial court found the
rebuttal evidence sufficient to overcome the State's prima facie evi-
dence, it would have been obligated to uphold the claim of privi-
lege.20
The special master found that the defendants had misrepre-
sented the health risks of smoking to the public and had utilized
their attorneys in carrying out their misrepresentations.2' The State
met its burden of establishing prima facie evidence of fraud. The
defendants, however, did not explain or rebut the State's evidence
to the court's satisfaction, and therefore they failed to meet their
burden of proof.
2. Washington v. American Tobacco Co.
In the State of Washington's case against tobacco manufactur-
ers to recover Medicaid expenses for smoking related illnesses, the
American Tobacco Co. claimed attorney-client or work product
privilege with respect to thirty-two documents produced earlier in
the cases of Burton v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co.2 2 and State ex rel. Hum-
23phrey v. Philip Morris Inc. The State challenged the privilege asser-
tions, claiming that the documents were not privileged, and even if
the court found privilege, the civil-fraud exception applied.24 The
16. See id.
17. See id. at 1255-56. The court discussed the higher burdens of proof of
clear and convincing evidence and evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. These
were rejected in favor of the lesser standard. The court stated that "[w]hen a
finder of facts 'weighs' evidence, we know of no lesser burden to apply to the
proof than a preponderance of evidence .... Id. at 1256.
18. 975 F.2d 81, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1992).
19. See American Tobacco, 697 So. 2d at 1252.
20. See id. at 1256.
21. See id. at 1257.
22. 177 F.R.D. 491, 494 (D. Kan. 1997).
23. No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 257214 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 1, 1997). Al-
though the court was aware of the rulings in the Burton case, the State's assertions
were reviewed de novo. See State v. American Tobacco Co., No. 96-2-15056-8 SEA,
1997 WL 728262 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1997).
24. See American Tobacco, 1997 WL 728262, at *1.
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court heard arguments, reviewed the documents in camera, and
then allowed the parties to file supplementary briefs regarding the
civil-fraud exception.' 5 The court rendered a painstakingly de-
tailed, document-by-document decision which ordered the full
production of twenty-seven documents while upholding the
claimed privilege on only six documents. 6
The court gave five different reasons for overcoming claims of
privilege on the various documents. First, documents disclosed
without objection in other litigation cannot be withheld on the ba-
sis of privilege; the privilege is deemed waived. 7  R.J. Reynolds
("RJR") produced a document in the Burton litigation and did not
claim privilege until it prepared its privilege log in the Minnesota
litigation. The court reasoned that although the inadvertent pro-
duction of a privileged document can often be remedied by return-
ing the document to the producing party without waiving the privi-
lege, in this case RJR reviewed the document for the Burton
litigation and chose not to redact a certain paragraph.2 Having
made that deliberate choice, all claims of privilege with respect to
that paragraph were waived and could not be recovered by a subse-
quent claim of inadvertence."
Second, a legitimate assertion of the attorney-client privilege
must include a request for or provision of legal advice that requires
the lawyer to act in his or her professional capacity and "not merely
as a convenient conduit for information or funds. "3 The court or-
dered production where, although it relates to the activities of
counsel, a document offers no indication that the attorney's in-
volvement was the result of a specific legal question posed, or
would result in legal analysis, or that legal advice would be ren-
dered. If the communications are not legal in nature, no privi-
33lege applies.
Third, communications protected by the attorney-client privi-
25. See id The court also reviewed the privilege logs from the Burton and
Philip Morris cases. See id.
26. See id, at *20. The six documents on which claims of privilege were sus-
tained were nevertheless ordered produced in redacted form. See id.
27. See id. at *1-*2.
28. See id.
29. See id. at *2.
30. See id.
31. Id (citing RNA. Hanson Co. v. Magnuson, 903 P.2d 496, 499 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1995)).
32. See id.
33. See id.
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lege must be made and kept in confidence.3 The court ruled that
widely circulated documents cannot be protected from jroduction
because they were not created or kept in confidence. Further-
more, documents not intended to be confidential cannot be
shielded by attorney-client privilege.36 The court ordered produc-
tion where RJR offered no evidence that the document was in-
tended to be confidential 7
Fourth, the work product privilege protects only documents
prepared in anticipation of litigation.3 Documents created for
both legal and nonlegal purposes do not enjoy the protection of
the work product privilege.3 9 Ordering the production of several
documents on which RJR asserted work product immunity, the
court reasoned that where RJR created documents in the ordinary
course of business, even though the document may have utility in
defending pending or threatened litigation, work product immu-
nity does not apply.4 "Such immunity is, however, appropriate only
where the primary motivating factor behind the creation of the
documents was the anticipation of litigation."41 Unless the docu-
ment is created because of the litigation, it is not entitled to immu-
nity.4
Fifth, documents that are, on their face, privileged will be sub-
ject to production if the party asserting the privilege attempts to
use it to further fraudulent conduct.43 In Washington, under Es-
calante v. Sentry Insurance," the party seeking discovery under the
civil-fraud exception must show a "foundation in fact" that (1) its
opponent was engaged in or was planning a crime or fraud at the
time the allegedly privileged communication was made; and (2) the
communication was made in furtherance of the crime or fraud.45
The court struggled with the Escalante standard and ultimately
34. See id. at *4.
35. See id.
36. See id. at *16. The court found that RJR offered no evidence that the
documents were intended to be confidential. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at *10.
39. See id.
40. See id. at *10-*13, *15, *17.*19.
41. Id. at *12.
42. See id. at *19 (emphasis added).
43. See id. at *4.
44. 743 P.2d 832 (Wash. App. 1987), review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1025 (1988).
45. See id. at 842-43. The Escalante court rejected the prima facie standard in
favor of the more lenient foundation in fact standard. See id. at 843.
1999] 1157
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could not reconcile it with the importance of protecting confiden-
tial attorney-client communications. 46 It chose to use the higher
prima facie standard instead.47
After the State made a prima facie showing of fraud, the court
examined each document "to determine whether it provide [d] evi-
dence that support[ed] the State's allegations that defendants en-
gaged in fraud and conferred with their attorneys in furtherance
thereof. "4 On six occasions the court found that the communica-
tion in question was not made in furtherance of fraud and upheld
the claim of privilege. 49 The court ordered only one document to
be produced solely because of the civil-fraud exception.50  The
court used the exception as "belt and suspenders," holding that the
documents that were improperly withheld as privileged would have
to be produced under the civil-fraud exception even if they were
privileged.
3. Burton v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
Plaintiff David Burton sought discovery of thirty-three docu-
ments51 related to Council for Tobacco Research ("CTR") special
projects withheld under attorney-client and work product privi-
leges.52 The court referred the matter to a magistrate judge, who
ordered production of all but one document.-5 RR moved the dis-
trict court for review of the magistrate's decision.
The court ruled that twenty-four documents withheld on the
basis of privilege were not in fact privileged.55 The court upheld
46. See American Tobacco, 1997 WL 728262, at *5.
47. See id. The court suggested that RJR could have rebutted the State's evi-
dence if it had made an effort to explain or counteract the inferences of fraud
drawn from the documents in question. See id. at *6 n.4. Since it did not, the
court found that the State met even the preponderance of evidence standard that
RJR had argued for in its subsequent filings. See id.
48. Id. at *5.
49. See id. at *6-*8, *14-*15. The court allowed communications to be re-
dacted from five documents. See id.
50. See id. at *19.
51. See Burton v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 177 F.R.D. 491, 494 (D. Kan.
1997). The documents sought were the same as those sought in the Washington
litigation. See supra Part IX.B.2 and accompanying text.
52. See Burton, 177 F.R.D. at 494.
53. See Burton v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 170 F.R.D. 481, 490 (D. Kan.
1997). RJR brought a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. See Burton v.
RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 321, 328-29 (D. Kan. 1997).
54. See Burton, 177 F.R.D. at 494.
55. See id. at 498.
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the magistrate's finding that the documents were not privileged
because RJR failed to show "the necessary nexus to litigation or le-, ,56
gal advice. The court stressed that not all communications to or
from counsel are privileged; they must relate to legal advice to be
protected.57 Thus, documents relating to scientific matters, general
business matters, or public relations issues do not enjoy the privi-
581lege.
The court also ordered the production of documents withheld
by RJR as work product.59 RJR argued unsuccessfully that docu-
ments created by the CTR's special projects generally were for theS• 60
purpose of litigation and as such were privileged. The court re-
quired RJR to link each document with some particular anticipated
or current litigation.! The court noted that "RJR and the CTR are
in the business of litigation. Accordingly, documents prepared in
the ordinary course of business of litigation without a tie to specific
litigation is not protected by work product immunity."
62
Finally, the court applied the crime-fraud exception to the
documents. Under Kansas law, the party seeking disclosure must
first establish a prima facie case that "legal service was sought or ob-
tained in order to enable or aid the commission or planning of a
crime or a tort."64 Having previously decided that the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case that RJR engaged in fraud concern-
ing the addictive nature of nicotine, the court made a two-part in-
quiry: (1) the crime or fraud must be established; and (2) the
communication must have been in furtherance of the crime or
56. Id. at 496. The documents were not protected due to their scientific na-
ture. See id. The court also found that RJR had not shown the necessary nexus to
litigation or legal advice for each of the documents. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 496-98.
59. See id. at 499.
60. See id. at 498.
61. See id.
62. Id. The court cited to Fourth Circuit and Eighth Circuit decisions in sup-
port of its position. See id. See also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet
Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that the document must be
prepared with the prospect of litigation); Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d
397, 401 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that even though litigation is in prospect,
documents produced in the ordinary course of business are not protected by the
work product immunity).
63. See Burton, 177 F.R.D. at 501-03.
64. KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-426(b) (1) (1994). See also Wallace, Sanders, Austin,
Brown & Enochs, Chtd. v. Louisburg Grain Co., 824 P.2d 933, 939 (Kan. 1992)
(holding that "sufficient evidence" means prima facie evidence).
1999] 1159
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fraud.65 The court found that thirty-one of the thirty-three docu-
ments did not contain evidence relating to the fraud. Two docu-
ments, however, would have had to be produced under the crime-
fraud exception even if they had been privileged.
67
4. Minnesota ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.
In State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.,6 the district court
reviewed the decision of the special master releasing more than
30,000 documents.69 The court adopted the special master's report
but added some clarifications and findings of fact.7" Although simi-
lar to the cases discussed previously, the court added a punitive
measure for the defendant's systematic mischaracterization of
documents.7'
The special master, with input from the parties, established a
process by which to evaluate the vast quantities of documents with-
72held by the defendants. Defendants were required to categorize
73
the documents according to twelve categories. The special master
then generated a random list of documents from each category for
74
in camera review. The parties made presentations, both in open
65. See Burton, 177 F.R.D. at 501-02.
66. See id. at 503.
67. See id.
68. No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 257214 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 7, 1998).
69. See id. at *6.
70. See id. at *1. The additional findings were: (1) defense counsel could not
unequivocally state that all documents were properly categorized; and (2) in many
instances, defendants claimed privilege where none existed and blatantly abused
the categorization process. See id. at *2-*3.
71. See id. at *4. The court admonished some of the defendants by writing:
If the Special Master finds that mischaracterization is more than a statis-
tical anomaly, privilege shall be waived as to all the documents listed in
Exhibit 1; the Court will not tolerate a pattern of abuse of the categoriza-
tion process.... The court notes... that the substantial number of
documents from which Defendants withdrew claims of privilege after the
Special Master's initial review of Liggett documents suggests that claims
of privilege were not always made in good faith.
Id. at *4-*5.
72. See id. at *6.
73. See id. at *5. The categories were: (1) Other Litigation; (2) No Attorney
Identified; (3) Science; (4) Attorney-Related Involvement in Smoking and Health;
(4a) Communications of Counsel; (4b) Special Projects; (4c) LS, Inc.; (5) Public
Statements; (6) Additives; (7) Children; (8) Advertisements; (9) Discovery; (10)
Government Regulations; (11) Patents/EPA; and (12) Other Documents. See id.
74. See id. at *6.
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court and ex parte, regarding the randomly selected documents,
and finally submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law.75 The special master recommended the release of all docu-
ments in four separate categories on two grounds: abuse of privi-
lege and the crime-fraud exception to privilege. 6
The court noted the defendants' abuse of privilege by citing
examples where they violated the court's orders and claimed privi-
lege for documents that obviously were not entitled to protection.
77
The court ruled that the abuse of privilege and violation of court
rules were reason enough to order release of the documents, and
the court advised that "[t]he intentional and repeated misuse of
claims of privilege is intolerable in a court of law, and an appropri-
ate sanction for such abuse is release of all documents for which
privilege is improperly claimed." 78 Further, the court reasoned
that, although documents within a category may contain privileged
material, "abuse of the privilege claim with respect to even one
document taints the category." 9 After the special master's spot-
check of the documents revealed a pattern of abuse, the court ex-
pected that a thorough, document-by-document investigation
would reveal even more abuses.80 Thus the court allowed "the light
of discovery to permeate" the categories of documents recom-
mended by the special master."'
The court also held that certain defendants were required
produce the documents because of the crime-fraud exception.82
Minnesota law requires plaintiffs to make a prima facie case that
the communication was made in furtherance of a crime or fraud
83and that it was closely related to the fraud . The special master
went beyond these requirements by conducting a two-prong in-
quiry: (1) whether the evidence showed by preponderance that the
defendants were engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct; and
(2) whether the evidence showed, again by preponderance, that
the involvement of defendants' attorneys was in furtherance or
75. See id.
76. See id. at *6-*7.
77. See id. at *7.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. See id. at *8.
83. See Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 469 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
1999] 1161
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closely related to the criminal or fraudulent conduct.s4 The court
noted specifically that the standard applied by the special master,
i.e., requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence, exceeded
85that required by Minnesota law.
The district court declined to analyze the reasons for finding
the crime-fraud exception applied, instead relying on the special
master's report.8 6 Other courts, examining the same tobacco in-
dustry documents came to the same conclusion: the documents
showed evidence of fraud and the role of counsel was in further-
ance of that fraud8 7
Christopher C. Young
84. See Philip Morris, 1998 WL 257214, at *8. Included in the definition of
"criminal or fraudulent conduct" are the failure to conduct appropriate research
into the safety of the products and the failure to warn consumers if the research
supported conclusions that the products were dangerous or addictive. Id.
85. See id. See also Levin, 469 N.W.2d at 515 (requiring only a prima facie
showing for the crime-fraud exception).
86. See Philip Morris, 1998 WL 257214, at *8.
87. See, e.g., Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 177 F.R.D. 491, 503 (finding
documents withheld were in furtherance of the fraud of concealing the addic-
tive nature of nicotine); State v. American Tobacco Co., No. 96-2-15056-8 SEA,
1997 WL 728262, at *8 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1997) (finding that counsel's
advice and legal conclusions relating to research projects purporting to find a
relationship between smoking and adverse health consequences provided evi-
dence of fraud); American Tobacco Co v. State, 697 So. 2d 1249, 1257 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (holding that tobacco companies concealed and misrepresented
health risks from the public and used their attorneys to perpetuate this fraud).
See also generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Tobacco Lawyers Shame the Entire Profession,
NAT'L L.J., May 18, 1998, at A22 (discussing the conduct of tobacco industry
lawyers revealed by the Minnesota litigation); Edward J. Cleary, The Use and
Abuse of the Attorney-Client Privilege, MINN. BENCH & B., Sept. 1998, at 18-19 (dis-
cussing ethical violations of tobacco industry lawyers).
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